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Abstract
This research project is an examination of the organization and behavior of
criminal group activity in the region of West Africa. An assessment of the size, structure,
and type of criminal enterprises these groups are involved in are investigated. It is also
uncovered if and how groups make use of corruption, the legit economy, and influence
politicians. The environment in which transnational crime is able to thrive is also of
great interest as the social, political, economic, and technological changes that occurred
alongside the sudden trend in transnational crime activity are considered. The
information is used to generate a discussion about the nature of transnational crime
and why it continues to thrive in this particular area. Finally the question is raised if
whether there is an alternative way to try and understand the reality of transnational
crime and the individuals involved.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In a global economy neo conservative and neo liberal economic ideologies of laissez
faire enforce markets to expand in order to maximize profits (Kraska, 2004). The free
unregulated competitive market is understood as the ideal model for a social order that
supports the freedom of choice, including choice in relation to consumption. There is
also a strong emphasis on cost-effective, results based, government coupled with
accountability at all levels (O’Malley, 1999). This sort of free market network
perpetuates the mass movement of goods and services and the development of
business enterprises capable to adjust, function, and compete in a global economy.
This type of free market agenda is the most common economic framework newly
independent countries adopt in attempt to construct democratic sovereign nationstates. Western governments believe modernization is a process that brings
impoverished countries into a new era of economic growth and prosperity. Neo
conservatives and neo-liberals promote the idea if the new nations adopt social and
political structures similar to Western industrial economies the tide of modernization
will push them along the transformative process (Kraska, 2004). West Africa is made up
of a conjunction of very young states including Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo all of which since
independence from colonial rule have adopted social and political structures similar to
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the West. These new sovereign nation-states are then thrust through the process of
modernization in which citizens experience urbanization, a decline in agricultural
populations, the loss of tribal customs, the rise of the nuclear family and the
manifestations of such social problems such as slums and urban poverty. This rapid
economic change reduces the stability of the traditional cultures and can cause several
conditions, which promote crime (Brillon, 1973). Even though most of these nations
have problems with violent conflict funded by the illegal trade of goods, free trade laws
enable and encourage people in this region to move freely across international borders.
The National institute of Justice defines transnational crime as premeditated group
criminal activity that crosses national borders. These illicit ventures more specifically
may include money laundering, human smuggling, cybercrime, and the trafficking of
humans, drugs, weapons, endangered species, body parts, or nuclear material (Voronin,
2000). The trend of planned illicit business ventures conducted by individuals working in
more than one country within the region of West Africa is unique to similar activity
other places in the world because it is a rather new phenomenon. Law enforcement
agencies in West Africa work hard to intercept, arrest, and punish those individuals
believed to be involved in transnational crime, but due to lack of collaboration,
corruption, and ethnic division law enforcement tends to be weak if not nonexistent
(Ebbe, 1999). There is very little research on transnational crime groups in West Africa,
which makes this area of particular interest to investigate. Africa, as a whole, is raising
global concern, as this area is now a transit point for illicit commodities, as it remains to
2

have problems with violent conflict and civil unrest (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 2001). The
purpose of this thesis is to try and better understand not only the behavior of the
individuals involved in West African transnational crime but also the environment in
which it thrives. In the study of transnational crime it is necessary to identify some of
the social, political, economic, and technological changes that occurred alongside the
sudden trend of transnational crime activity. What has contributed to the sudden
increase in the number of young entrepreneurs who engage or will engage in some type
of criminal activity at some level that makes it necessary to cross national borders? Why
is it also more common and possible for young entrepreneurs to profit both illegally and
legally off one or several illicit and legitimate transnational enterprises at once?
It is necessary to conduct a content analysis of the research and available
information on transnational crime in the West African Region in order to help
determine the sizes and structures of transnational crime groups here, the type of
criminal enterprises these groups are involved in, if and how they make use of
corruption, the legit economy, and influence politicians. The information is used to
generate a discussion about the nature of transnational crime and why it continues to
thrive in this particular area. Finally the question is raised if whether there might be
other ways to try and understand the reality of transnational crime and the individuals
involved. If so, how might an alternative understanding change the way government
officials combat transnational crime in not only West Africa, but also other regions of
the world?
3

The next chapter begins with a brief review of some of the literature on
organized crime to help to connect previous organized crime research with the current
study of transnational criminal activity in West Africa. Since transnational crime
involves the collaboration of individuals, what does earlier research on organized crime
reveal about criminal collaborative enterprises?
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Knowledge on transnational crime with the criminal justice discipline stems from
three different paradigms that focus on the structure of organized crime groups. A
model, or paradigm, is an effort to draw a picture of a piece of reality in order to
understand it better (Albanese, 2007). The very definition of “organized crime” is,
however, debatable as the phrase itself is rather generic and includes a wide variety of
criminal behavior. How one defines organized crime is extremely important because the
definition helps to shape perspective which influences the conduction of research, the
creation of laws against it, the investigation process, the conduction of prosecutions,
and the provision of mutual legal assistance across national borders (Finckenauer,
2005). The paradigms for organized crime address the characteristics, behavior, and
structure of criminal groups in order to define and make sense of their behavior in order
to identify a cause or the causes of their actions.
Hierarchal Model
Traditional law enforcement perspectives on organized crime in the United
States and Canada in the 1960s reflected ideas of tightly organized, singular, alien
conspiratorial groups (Beare, Naylor 1999). The Hierarchical Model of Organized Crime
portrays crime groups to arrange in order of rank or grade. This model was put forth
5

first in these terms by Estes Kefauver, a U.S. Senator who conducted hearings on the
subject of organized crime in 1950 but it wasn’t until 1963 that evidence was produced
to support this theory. It was Senator John McClellan that held public hearings during
this time and presented the government’s first “insider” on organized crime. The insider
was Joseph Valachi who testified organized crime was composed of “family” structures
with graded ranks of authority from boss down to soldiers with the bosses being
responsible to oversee the activities of family members. A “commission” of bosses
handles inter-family relations and disputes (Albanese, 2007). The terms kingpin and
mafia were officially coined to describe a criminal mastermind and a family of criminal
cohorts. This paradigm supports the notion the arrest of key individuals will dismantle
entire criminal organizations and help combat criminal group activity.
Local, Ethnic Model
Critiques and alternative paradigms began to arise in the 1970s along with a
growing body of scholarly research conducted under the subject heading of organized
crime. The Local, Ethnic Model of organized crime finds criminal relations to exist
among naturally occurring friendships based on cultural and economic ties (Albini,
1975). Studies during this time also found cultural and ethnic ties link organized crime
groups rather than a hierarchical structure and appear rather local in nature without
apparent connections to a national crime syndicate (Albanese, 2007). This paradigm
describes organized crime groups as family oriented business like organizations made up
of only those individuals who possess certain ethnic qualities or cultural backgrounds.
6

The differences between different ethnic backgrounds determine what type of crime a
group is involved in and to what extend an individual is involved. This paradigm is often
used in unison with the first paradigm because it supports the notion organized crime is
“family” based. It is not surprising, however, for families bound with close personal
relationships due to kinship or camaraderie to trust one another enough to conspire
together and engage in organized crime. This paradigm helps to validate the existence
of The Russian Mafia and La Costa Nostra or the Italian Mafia, which alienates certain
individuals. It is important to remember, however, this paradigm understands
individuals to control their own activities and take partners as they wish, which
promotes the idea groups are less strictly structured. The phenomenon of transnational
crime as a whole, however, breaks the boundaries of ethnicity. Groups involved in
transnational criminal activity often collaborate with individuals of various ethnicities in
order to minimize risk, maximize profit, and facilitate market expansion much like any
other legitimate transnational business (Potter, 1994).
Business Enterprise Model
The Business Enterprise Model understands organized crime groups conspire just
like any other business enterprise. A growing number of investigations find various
types of relationships exist between individuals involved in transnational crime.
Whether they are hierarchical in nature or based on ethnic commonalities or friendship,
interpersonal relationships form the genesis of organized criminal activity. Researchers
who adhere to this school of thought believe if the factors that cause illicit relationships
7

to form are isolated; a determination about the true causes of organized crime can be
made. It is the conspiratorial nature of organized crime that makes it so serious. It is not
the individual drug dealer or the illegal casino operator that cause public concern, as
much as how these individuals organize their customers, suppliers, and functionaries to
provide illicit goods and services for profit (Potter, 1994). The same fundamental
assumptions that govern entrepreneurship in the legitimate capitalist marketplace such
as the necessity to maintain and extend one’s financial net worth, also govern the
illegitimate marketplace.
Organized crime groups form and thrive in the same way that legitimate
businesses do by responding to the needs and demands of suppliers, customers,
regulators, and competitors in order to generate a profit. The business enterprise model
of organized crime focuses on how capitalist economic considerations, rather than
hierarchal or ethnic relationships lie at the base of the formation and success of
organized crime groups. Regardless of ethnicity or hierarchy, the Enterprise Model
labels economic concerns as the primary cause of organized criminal behavior
(Albanese, 2007). Dealers and smugglers are found to operate within an illicit market
that is largely competitive and disorganized rather than visibly structured. Disputes are
often settled in a spontaneous and unrestricted manner (Adler, 2000). A study on
bookmaking, loan sharking, and numbers gambling in New York City finds that economic
forces arising from the illegality of the product tend to fragment the market making it
very difficult to legally control or centralize these activities on a large scale (Albanese,
8

2007). The supply of illegal goods is not marketed by a tendency toward the
development of large-scale criminal enterprises, due to the illegal nature of the product.
Instead, smaller, more flexible and efficient enterprises characterize organized crime
(Paoli, 2002). The networking necessary to generate good business in the legit business
world is also necessary for the illicit business world.
How involved individuals structure themselves and collaborate to enable
international market expansion and profitability remains open to interpretation by the
researcher. Since transnational crime is a rather new phenomenon in West Africa, it is
important take into consideration the similar criminal activity that has long taken place
in some other regions of the world and to see if and how the above three paradigms are
reinforced in the descriptions.
Russian Crime
Russian crime groups are defined by the threat and use of violence necessary to
gain and maintain control of criminal markets. Retributive violence is often used within
and between criminal groups to settle disputes. The distinctiveness of Russian crime
groups is the degree to which their influence has become embedded in the Post Soviet
political system. The global move from state regulated to an unregulated free market
economy has created a challenge to legal systems around the world. The political and
economic forces around the globe determine to some extent the nature of criminal
activities and with the spread of capitalism, rapid economic change seems to occur
along with a surge in the scope of illegal actions carried out by citizens. Privatization of
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state property has positioned the current international focus on Russian crime (Beare,
2000). The economic structure of a sovereign nation has a drastic impact on the type of
activities carried out by individual citizens such as whether they act alone or in
collaboration with others.
Bureaucrats, underground businesspersons, and professional criminals act as key
agents and beneficiaries of the economic “liberation”. These three tiers result from an
economy in which the government could not ensure the citizenry access to basic
necessities needed for everyday survival. The unpredictable economy of Russia created
the perfect environment for criminals with similar past experiences from the Soviet
Union to flourish. Crime was seen as a necessary means to an end (Finckenauer &
Waring, 2001, Beare 2000). This sense of instability is what also makes the structure of
Russian crime groups different from groups believed to function like the La Cosa Nostra.
It is conceived that Soviet Union criminals operate mostly as individual specialists
instead of the traditional hierarchy structures. This suggests that the Russian crime
groups are not rigidly authoritarian and those involved do not answer to anyone in
particular.
Russia is believed to pose a large threat to the West, the United States in
particular, in which roughly 15 groups composed of 500-600 members are currently
operating out of. This degree of infiltration into the United States resulted in the US law
enforcement strategy for Russian crime groups outlined by the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the justice department’s Criminal Division in 1999 (Voronin, 2001).
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These varied criminal groups are extensively involved in a broad array of frauds and
scams including health care fraud, insurance scams, stock frauds, antique swindles,
forgery, and fuel tax evasion schemes. Russians have also become the principle ethnic
group involved credit card fraud in the United States. The laundering of huge profits
being made abroad is increasing its penetration into legitimate sectors of the global
economy (Waring, 2001). Even though they have the finances to do so, there is no
evidence any of these groups have penetrated the United States political system
(Finckenauer, 2001, 2007). Russia then, very similarly to West Africa has experienced a
rise in criminal activity abroad while attempting to adapt to what are understood
ideologically as democratic customs politically, economically, and socially.
Asia and the Pacific Region Criminal Groups
Social disorganization due to large-scale immigration in the Asia and Pacific
region has disrupted families and resulted in economic instability and social stress. The
unequal distribution of opportunities for legitimate economic advancement combined
with the high value given to material gain has fostered widespread illegal activities to
increase wealth. Corporate deviance and crime have increased as domestic enterprises
have multiplied, foreign investments have grown, and multinational corporations have
expanded to Asia and the Pacific. As government bureaucrats increase their influence
on economic activities in many Asian and Pacific countries, corruption of public officials
follows. The three major drug production bases and the largest drug consumer market
in the world are located in this region, making drug smuggling a significant problem.
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Human trafficking and illegal immigration are prevalent in the region due to uneven
economic development, natural disasters, political instability, military uprising, cultural
clashes, as well as social instability (Shaw, 2003). Capitalism advancing and socialism
retreating at both national and international levels only seems to cause economic and
social gaps which weakens state and societal controls on socioeconomic problems.
The Fuk Ching Chinese crime group, which emerged in New York City in the
1980s, comprised of Chinese individuals seeking to enter into the global economy for
their own financial and material self interests. Currently the Fuk Ching is estimated to
have approximately 35 members with another 20 members in prison. Experts agree
that the Fuk Ching, like other Chinese gangs do not have the connections and
sophistication necessary to corrupt U.S. police and judges (Ko-lin Chin & Finckenauer,
2004). Although Fuk Ching has some ability to manipulate the political system through
corruption in the Fujian Province with respect to their human trafficking, there is no
evidence the Fuk Ching has corrupted the political process of the United States. This
group mainly operates extortion and protection rackets in defined neighborhoods in
New York’s Chinatown, with victims being mostly businesses. The transnational activity
of the group consists of the smuggling of migrants across national borders and human
trafficking that includes coercion and exploitation in the destination country
(Finckenauer, 2006).
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The Criminal Groups of the Netherlands
Understanding how criminals are able to work together undetected is the first
fundamental step in creating policy to counteract transnational crime. After assessing
the evidence of corruption, violence, and intimidation, and the interaction between
crime groups and the legal economy in the Netherlands, one may conclude the concept
of “mafia type” crime families contradicts the literature on crime groups in the
Netherlands. An alternative theoretical framework concerning crime groups widely
accepted in Dutch policy and research circles recognizes the primary business of
“organized crime” is “transit crime” (international illegal trade, using the same
opportunity structure that facilitates legal economic activities). This contrasts with the
view that organized crime is interested in controlling economic sectors or regions.
Crime groups should instead be viewed as “criminal networks” rather than pyramidal
structures (Kleemens, 2007; Kleemans & Bunt, 2007). A study to examine the nature,
seriousness, and scope of organized crime in St. Maarten, located in the Netherlands
Antilles, found that many individuals on the island are involved in the transportation of
drugs. People of different nationalities in St. Maarten are involved and work together in
a more or less organized manner making use of long term and temporary collaborations.
Legit businesses also carry out roles of specialization in the illicit drug trade (Verhoeven,
Bokhorst, Leeuw, Bogaerts, Scotborgh-vn de Van, 2007). Criminal group activity here
does not coincide with the theory of the large and highly structured mafia style groups.
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Columbian Crime Groups
The Columbian cocaine trade is characterized by a fluid social system with
flexible exchange networks that expand and contract in response to market
opportunities and regulatory constraints. This durable elastic structure developed over
many years as entrepreneurs built their enterprises through the establishment of
personal contacts, repeated exchanges, and resources they accumulated gradually.
They drew on socioeconomic traditions, such as contraband smuggling, that extend far
back into Columbia’s colonial past. Nodes that consist of individuals and groups make
up Columbian drug trafficking networks. Some nodes consist of brokers who facilitate
transactions between various parties, while other nodes are composed of several
individuals who function as a unit and engage in various smuggling rings and distribution
cells that transport and sell drugs. These social networks of individuals and groups are
embedded within and across larger organizational networks. Social networks
decentralize decision-making authority and rely on brokers and intermediaries to buffer
entrepreneurs themselves from direct complicity in criminal activity. To combat these
criminal nodes the Columbian National Police have in fact targeted more than 300
“kingpins” for capture (Kenney, 2007). The fact there are so many alleged bosses is an
indication that the cartel concept was flawed from the beginning.

14

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
A content analysis of accessible information and previous research on
transnational crime in West Africa is placed under review and considered for this
project. This type of analysis is helpful when one attempts to identify patterns, themes,
biases, and meanings related to a certain topic (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005; Neuendorf,
2002). By maintaining the focus on the region of West Africa, instead of Africa as an
entire continent, more attention is paid to individual interceptions and arrests to better
reveal any trends of transnational criminal activity.
Difficulties of Transnational Crime Research
Transnational crime research has always posed considerable problems for the
obvious reasons. Data is extremely hard to come by and is often obtained from police
sources that are often less than fully adequate. Also, the criminals involved in
transnational crime activity do not easily cooperate in academic research due to their
wish to remain anonymous, unknown, and undetectable. This research is primarily a
descriptive analysis, which adds to the general baseline of case studies, which will
promote a fuller understanding of transnational crime in general. Ideally, by reviewing a
good number of previous documented academic, government, and private
organizational research on transnational crime and then comparing this literature to
criminal records, data, and journalistic accounts a more accurate portrayal of the reality
15

in which criminals are able to engage in illicit enterprises at a transnational scale is
possible.
Little baseline data exist on transnational crime due to the fact law enforcement
agencies often do not keep recorded data on arrests or interceptions of illicit goods and
in the case of West Africa, even fewer research is recorded in English, so many of the
significant details may be hindered by difficulties in translation. A growing body of
literature points to the methodological difficulties associated with studying illicit and
therefore hidden activities, including those related to transnational crime. These include
the requirement to collect data from multiple sources, the difficulties of doing so, and
the challenge of drawing conclusions based on fragmentary data (Rawlinson, 1999;
Winlow, Hobbs, Lister, & Hadfield, 2001). In regard to transnational crime itself, there is
a rather small specialist literature in the academic field of criminology and sociology, but
even fewer such works are found that fully engage in the circumstances and experience
of transnational criminal activity in West Africa (Ellis, 2003). Past research also tends to
make generalizing assumptions about the cause of transnational crime based on the few
individuals who are intercepted by police agencies. The individual actors involved
become the problem instead of perhaps an inability for new governments to ensure all
the basic necessities for life are made accessible to the population.
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Sources
In regard to certain types of serious crime, specifically in regards to drugtrafficking, non-African sources of statistics were identified for this project. This is a
crime to which governments in Europe and the United States devote a considerable
amount of attention to and the type of crime West African groups reportedly play an
important role in. For example, in the United States the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) finds that Trafficking groups composed of West African criminals
smuggle South East Asian heroin to the United States. Nigerian criminals have been
most active in US cities such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Houston, New York City, Dallas, New
York City, Newark, Chicago, and Washington D.C. Chicago, just over the past several
years, has actually become a hub for heroin trafficking controlled by Nigerian criminals
who primarily deal in Asian heroin (Potter, 1994). Various United States government
agencies publish both analyses and statistics concerning West African participation in
the global drug trade. The Federation of American Scientists report in a British study 65
percent of the heroin seizures of 50 grams or more in British airports in the mid-1990s
came from Nigeria (United Nations, 2005). Particularly useful for analytical purposes are
documents published by the State Department, many of them available on their
website, most notably the annual reports published by its Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
The present study makes use of all the above sources but at the same time
remains aware of the serious limitations and problems with reliability and validity
17

official government documents often have. The study also makes use of the country and
sector studies complied by consultants engaged by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (United Nations, 2005). These findings were presented and recorded in
Dakar, Senegal, on April 2-3 April 2004. The five country studies of the West African
Region consisted of a standard questionnaire which consultants were required to
answer, accompanied by country specific views on different issues concerning
transnational crime. In addition, papers presented by experts on diamond smuggling,
drug smuggling, and arms trafficking provide a large part of the empirical data used for
this study in conjunction with official documents found on transnational crime in other
parts of the world.
It is relevant to note at this point the growing general opinion among
criminologist and other academic specialists is transnational crime and organized crime
are both a less clear cut object of inquiry than once seemed to be the case (Williams,
2004). In part, this is a reflection of the growing sophistication with which researchers
have viewed the subject, suggesting that the closer one examines transnational crime
the less organized it actually appears.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Origins of Transnational Crime in West Africa
Transnational crime in West Africa consists of criminal network enterprises
collaborating and coming into contact due to mass immigration and the cultivation of
newly independent states in which borders are transforming colonies into sovereign
nations. Transnational crime in West Africa is generally perceived to have emerged in
the 1970s, in correspondence with the oil price rises of the decade, the de-linkage of the
dollar from gold, high inflation, and the rapid spread of debt in the developing world
with the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs by The World Bank, intended
to help stimulate the economy. Nevertheless, it would be naive to insist on this exact
chronology as the Nigerian country consultant identifies the roots of the new patterns
of crime existing slightly earlier (Alemika, 2004). Similar behavior is traced back decades
earlier, to the ancient traditions of long distance commerce historically characteristic of
the region. There is also evidence of European criminal gangs who pioneered transcontinental crime from bases in West Africa during colonial times. In The Ivory Coast,
even before independence in 1960, there were Corsican gangs specializing in cigarette
smuggling as well as the recruitment of women for prostitution (Ellis, 1997). When and
where exactly transnational crime began in West Africa is then a rather difficult question
to answer with great certainty.
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It was not only the general economic climate of the 1970s that caused some
people to turn to crime as a means of livelihood on a scale previously unseen, but also
some of the institutional arrangements that were introduced to stimulate trade. A
Sierra Leonean police official, for example, connects the rise of transnational crime in his
country to the creation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in
1975, which facilitated movement between member States (Alemika, 2004). While
there had always been movements of people from place to place, the circumstances of
civil wars occurring in the late 1970s stimulated some very large population migrations.
Before the early 1980s the Nigerian economy was booming and immigrants from other
parts of the Africa, most notably Ghanaians, were attracted to come here for financial
opportunity. Ghanaians were among the first West Africans in modern times to migrate
widely. With the onset of major economic problems in the 1970s and benefiting from
the country’s generally high standard of education, a large number of people who spoke
English were able to compete in transnational labor markets. This created a tradition of
migration by young Ghanaian men in search of economic and social advancement but
the down turn in the oil economy caused many such migrants to move on in search of
new opportunities.
After the end of the oil boom in Nigeria, in the early 1980s, Nigerians were
impelled to spread throughout the region in search of economic opportunity. A Sierra
Leone police officer notes, “It is now firmly held that transnational crime and the groups
involved were first introduced into Sierra Leone by Nigerians” (Lengor, 2004). The Ivory
20

Coast offered a similar allure to Nigerians in the Anglophone world. Transnational crime
and the criminal groups involved are believed to have arrived in the early 1980s when
the country attracted large numbers of Nigerian immigrants in search of work. A
problem of armed robbery emerged, as bands of immigrants formed that were later
joined by Ivorians (Sissoko, 2004). In 1983, Nigeria officially expelled millions of
Ghanaian migrants, “…in a bid to rid itself of unwanted guests” (Lenor, 2004; 5). Most
returned to Ghana, but a fair proportion of these promptly migrated once again to
wherever they believed they might find work and as other foreign job markets became
more difficult, many appear to have been attracted to illicit forms of enrichment (United
Nations, 2005). In Ghana, transnational crime appears to emerge in the 1980s,
connected with the problems and the opportunities offered by mass migration. Some
politically controversial attempts to regulate immigration in the 1990s have become
inextricably connected to the violence that has now emerged in the country, creating a
mix of crime, politics, violence and debates on identity and migration (Aning, 2005).
Moreover, wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone facilitate the import of firearms by armed
groups, including armed robbers, to The Ivory Coast (Lengor, 2004). A roughly similar
development appears to have occurred in Senegal, where armed robbery, marijuana
trading, and weapons trafficking is connected to the emergence of a low intensity
armed conflict in the Casamance region since the early 1980s. Indeed, it sometimes
appears that the conflict in Casamance has lost almost any ideological or political
content it may once have had, and has become a pretext for various forms of crime
(Evans, 2003). War then becomes a profitable and necessary means to maintain the
21

illegal markets. Even the Senegalese armed forces are found to be involved in criminal
activity such as abusing official procedures to buy and sell weapons illegally. In 2003, for
example, Spanish authorities seized weapons on a ship in Barcelona that had been
loaded in the republic of Korea and was destined for Dakar. It emerged that the
weapons had been purchased by the Senegalese military without providing full
information to civilian officials within the defense ministry (Vines, 2004).
One expert believes traces of transnational crime and criminal networks involved
may be identified in Nigeria before the 1970’s in the form of crime groups involved in
falsifying imports in order to transfer funds outside the country, normally in breach of
currency regulations. This process involved over-invoicing, or importing sub standard
goods for delivery to governmental departments, in return for kickbacks paid to
government officials. This may be regarded as a pioneering form of the widespread
frauds that were to become a trademark of West African criminal networks in later
years. The same expert agrees with many other sources, however, that in general, the
1980s was the decade that first witnessed the flourishing of transnational crime in
Nigeria. This is attributed to the general corruption of the civilian government of 1979 –
1983; the introduction of a structural adjustment program in 1986 which resulted in
greater poverty, unemployment, an increase in migration, the rapid and ill prepared
liberalization of the financial sector, and the establishment of poorly regulated finance
houses and banks which all provide new opportunities for money-laundering, fraud, and
illegal foreign exchange transactions (Alemika, 2004). From the late 1980s transnational
22

advance fee fraud became a public issue in Nigeria for the first time, apparently
developing from the prior existence of corrupt dealings in foreign exchange and the
transfer of stolen funds through foreign businesses and entrepreneurs (United Nations,
2005).
Size of Transnational Crime Groups in West Africa
Research for the present study did not reveal any statistical estimates
concerning the overall size and value of organized crime in West Africa. Even if such
figures were published, they would need to be treated with great caution. Crime figures
are extremely hazardous in all countries because a large majority of crime goes
undetected and can only be estimated on the basis of arrests and interceptions. In the
case of West Africa, statistics are more than usually hard to come by. No police force in
West Africa publishes comprehensive figures on crime seizures or arrests (Williams,
2004). Not only are there no reliable statistics, law enforcement agencies do not
collaborate with researchers to investigate the sources, patterns, trends, and
organizational structure of criminal groups throughout the region (Alemika 2004). Some
tentative observations of the number of people involved in transnational crime within
the area can be made, however, on the basis of rather scarce statistics of drug seizures
made in West Africa or of cargoes that have traveled across the region.
The West African region does play a significant role in the transnational
transport of drugs. It is striking that, with the exception of marijuana, a relatively lowvalue commodity, and some psychotropic substances that are manufactured locally,
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illegal drugs that pass through West Africa are not produced in the region nor are their
prime markets here. In other words, West Africa has come to play a significant role as a
point of transshipment for cargoes of heroin and cocaine that are produced in South
Asia and South America and are destined for markets in Europe or North America. The
Ivory Coast appears to be a major transit point for heroin en route to Europe, and Ghana
for cocaine headed for the same destination, although why there is such a specialization
between these two countries is unclear (Quist, 2004). While the organizers of these
narcotics trades are of diverse ethnicities, a considerable number of them are indeed
African. Much of the cocaine passing through Ghana and other countries of the region
appears previously to have traveled through Nigeria (United Nations, 2005).
In the mid 1980s, the United States authorities estimated that Nigerians made 58
percent of fraudulent insurance claims in their country, and that Nigerian fraudsters
were responsible for some $20-26 billion worth of fraud each year in the United States
alone (United Nations, 2005). Notorious Nigerian advance-fee frauds known as “419”
letters are estimated to be worth several hundred million US dollars a year (Olukoya,
2002). British police in 1997 received from members of the public 68,000 reports of
“419” letters sent by Nigerian gangs, with very many more being circulated but never
made known to police (Elliott, 1998). Occasional figures like these suggest little more
than fraud of various types is indeed carried out by West Africans internationally and on
a substantial scale. Some individual cases can certainly involve huge amounts of money
as indicated by the arrest of Emmanuel Nwude and others who were involved in an
advance fee fraud of no less than $240-245 million US Dollars (Alemika, 2004).
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While drug smuggling and advance fee frauds perpetrated by West Africans are
among the types of activity that generate the most concern internationally, evidence
suggests that certain other major fields of criminal activity recorded in the region
receive little attention despite (or because of) their clear political importance (Williams,
2004). In regard to “oil bunkering” in Nigeria, for example, the smuggling of crude oil is
estimated to account for as much as 35 percent of the country’s oil exports, although
estimates vary widely. Senior Nigerian government sources have themselves stated that
as many as 30,000 barrels of oil may be exported from the country illegally everyday,
although this figure is regarded by officials to be very low (Alemika, 2004). In any event,
it implies the occurrence of illegal oil exports amounting to over a billion US dollars
annually and perhaps three or four times that figure occur within Nigeria alone (United
Nations, 2005).
Structure
Free trade laws and the presence of technology facilitating mass communication
allows organized crime groups to fashion themselves like that of any other business
enterprise. Collaboration between groups has allowed businesses to stretch across
national boundaries giving rise to the new phenomena of transnational crime. Unlike
large corporations, however, of hierarchal structure, organized crime groups thrive and
multiply through the use of a complex and fragmented networking apparatus. The
bureaucratic structure of a large corporation would make crime groups more vulnerable
to law enforcement detection. Therefore, instead of crime groups looking to compete
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with one another, individuals of different groups with different connections make new
connections and/or terminate old business ties to expedite the manufacture,
transportation, and/or distribution profitability and limit the risk of detection by law
enforcement. The investment of money made through the illicit market is even done
with the collaboration of those investors involved in the legit economy (United Nations,
2005).
In attempt to describe the structure of criminal groups in West Africa the
business enterprise paradigm becomes the most helpful when trying to make sense of
what would otherwise be, a tangled web of permanent, semi-permanent, and
temporary networks. By utilizing a social network in which individuals work together,
irregularly and on a need to know basis, individuals are able to interact just enough to
carry out business exchanges and transactions at the transnational level. The
hierarchical, corporation like model is hardly known or even relevant in this region of
the world. Groups tend to organize themselves more so in project based type
relationships. Whoever becomes useful or has the necessary resources to get a job done
is who becomes involved in the functioning of an enterprise at one point or another.
Criminal enterprises in West Africa use similar techniques to involve legitimate traders
and businesses typically in societies sharing a common ancestry. The standard
procedure is as follows,
“…an individual entrepreneur who succeeds in making money in a particular
field, as the volume of business grows, will invite one or more junior relatives or
other dependents to join him or her in the business. These newcomers
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effectively become apprentices to the original entrepreneur. If further
manpower is required, other personnel may be recruited for a specific task, but
not other wise retained for permanent employment” (Forrest, 1994; 27).
One of the consequences of this mode of operation is that it tends to form very
close ties between different families, ethnicities, and between illicit and legitimate
business personnel. First the enterprises usually involve master entrepreneurs and their
apprentices who are training to become traders or suppliers in specific goods and
services. Second, there is cooperation among the enterprises/entrepreneurs, such that
if goods are not available in a given area or shop then they are collected and supplied
from another entrepreneur. Third, many of the entrepreneurs have relationships or
acquaintances, which facilitate payment for the imported goods for commission
(Alemika, 2004). In other words, major drug traffickers, for example, may employ
others on a one-time basis to perform certain tasks, such as making a delivery, or driving
a car to a given point, or physically carrying illicit goods from one country to another
filling the role of the “mule” or courier.
It should be noted that this casual impromptu approach to criminal activity
makes detection extremely difficult since groups do not necessarily contain a set
amount of actors or individuals that carry out the enterprise. Police services from
various parts of the world report the interrogation of an intercepted drug courier from
West Africa often reveals very little about the individuals who have employed the
courier to carry the drugs across national borders. Typically couriers are employed for
only several hundred dollars and are only given information on a need to know basis
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and typically know very little about whom they are working for or even who is receiving
the smuggled goods. They are often hired by a person using a pseudonym, and given
instructions to deliver a package to a certain address, or to await a call, with no further
information (Williams, 2004). Hiring personnel for specific projects only, rather than
hiring them on a permanent basis makes it very difficult for law enforcement officials to
gather any helpful information from individuals placed under arrest for involvement in
such illegal behavior.
This project-based mode of networking, often associated with patterns of
recruitment based on kinship, has proved itself highly adaptable to transnational
commerce in profitable illicit markets. For example, a gang was broken up in January
2004 after Sierra Leone police had arrested a Nigerian at Lungi International Airport in
possession of 4.2 kilograms of cocaine. The culprit was one of a network of Nigerians,
who lived in Freetown and ran a shop selling spare parts for cars. His role was to receive
couriers arriving at Lungi airport, arrange accommodations for them, and dispatch
couriers bound for Europe with drugs collected in Freetown. A Nigerian woman living in
Lagos, a city in southwestern Nigeria would then smuggle the drug cargoes into Sierra
Leone for distribution (Lengor, 2004). Relationships of this sort enable successful drug
smuggling groups to become “vertically integrated” having associates at every stage of
the trading chain from buying at the source, to the point of retail sale. Every stage in
between is handled by members of the same network maximizing profits and enabling
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groups to coexist with other competitors such as Columbian criminal groups that deal
with much larger quantities of cocaine (Williams, 2004).
Computer crime, which typically involves the use of the Internet and email for
various types of fraud, generates its own forms of organization. Most obviously, this
activity requires a relatively high standard of education in the sense that people
involved need to be skilled at working with computers and does not necessarily need
accomplices to successfully pursue their activities. A Ghanaian analyst notes two modes
of operation that are typical of computer fraud. In the more hierarchal of the two, an
experienced operator provides the initial resources to a small number of apprentices,
including access to the Internet. In the second mode, an individual operator sends out
his or her own “419” messages to potential victims. A “419” message or letter is an
advance fee fraud scam involving a confidence trick in which the target is persuaded to
advance relatively small sums of money in the hope of realizing a much larger gain. If
the operator succeeds in attracting a response, he then engages other partners for this
particular scheme, taking the lead role for the duration of the scam only to return to
solitary work (Williams, 2004).
Ghanaian blacksmiths able to produce firearms using the artisan tools and
materials at their disposal also work with a small number of people. Research indicates
that illegal firearm manufacturing is organized by guilds whose basic structure is of
some 10 -15 members, and sometimes as many as 50 members in cases where
production has grown to include other goods. As in any major production process,
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there are internal hierarchal distinctions, based on leadership, experience, levels of
training, and trust. Hence, many individuals involved may only be aware of one part of
the process, which involve such aspects as where to purchase raw materials, marketing,
and contacts within law enforcement. Normally, such specialized skills are handed
down from father to son within families (United Nations, 2005).
Ultimately, with some exceptions and depending on the type of enterprise,
criminal groups in West Africa tend to structure themselves in a less strict hierarchal
organized fashion to co exists with larger competitive groups. There are very few
examples of hierarchal groups with long-term associations. Far more common are the
project-based operations, in which a criminal entrepreneur and two or three
apprentices hire others for specific purposes, and for a short duration, using a
traditional method of organizing a business. Recruitment also takes place through
channels of kinship or other association. There is also a high degree of activity by
individuals who act alone as well, such as people who try their chance at drug
smuggling. West African criminal networks, however, are at the forefront of
transnational developments, as academic criminologists and law enforcement officials
are currently emphasizing the importance of networks rather than the idea of strict
mafia style organizations (Williams, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 2001). The criminal networks of
West Africa are adapting and adjusting quite successfully to the global capitalist age of
transnational business and exchange.
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The Role of Ethnicity & Social Relationships
The practice of recruiting through networks of kinship, typically based on villages
or other region of origin, means that the endeavors of criminal networks are facilitated
by cultural codes known to the perpetrators, but more or less impenetrable to
outsiders, including law enforcement officers. Relevant examples of this include the
practice of administering oaths sworn by reference to religious oracles, and the use of
local languages or dialects that make infiltration by outsiders extremely difficult.
Western police officers often point out that it is virtually impossible for them to
infiltrate a West African criminal network personally for rather obvious reasons, and
that it is almost as difficult to find translators who can decipher taped phone
conversations in some parts of West Africa, including south eastern Nigeria, noted for
the entrepreneurial talents of its people, local dialects differ greatly even in small areas
(United Nations, 2005).
The effect of recruitment through personal networks creates an association
between certain trades and specific places. Nigerian networks of prostitution, for
example, are frequently associated with Edo State and with Benin City because those
that pioneered the trade have kept it in the hands of networks of kin and associates,
thus excluding outsiders. This inadvertently creates the impression to outsiders that
particular ethnic groups dominate certain branches of commerce, whether legitimate or
illicit. For example, a Nigerian law enforcement officer noted that drug trafficking
networks appear to be dominated by lgbo-speaking people from southeast Nigeria and
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Yoruba and by southern minority groups. Such may also be deduced from the names of
people arrested and tried in both Nigeria and abroad, from records of the Nigerian Drug
Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and from newspaper articles (Alemika, 2004). An
officer of the Sierra Leone police remarks that the lgbos and Yoruba from Nigeria
dominate the drug trade in his country (Lengor, 2004). He attributes this partly to the
migration of considerable numbers lgbos during the Biafra war of the 1960s, as well to
an older tradition of Yoruba migration. The establishment of Diasporas from these
groups has facilitated their creation of transnational networks in more recent times
(Alemika, 2004).
Transnational Criminal Enterprises in West Africa
After understanding how criminal groups generally tend to operate in this region
of the world it is important to know what types of criminal enterprises crime groups are
involved in. In this section the known nature, extent, and diversity of the activities of
organized criminal groups in West Africa are discussed and presented. This is done to
provide some indication as to the complexity of illegal activity in the region. The
specific areas mentioned below were selected by the UNODC as the most important.
The two areas that create the most concern internationally are the trafficking of drugs
and serious fraud carried out by West Africans, either in their own region of origin or
outside of it (Williams, 2004).
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Drug trafficking
Cases of drug trafficking exist in West Africa as far back as the 1930s but the
region’s emerging role as a transit point for global movements of narcotics can be said
to have become a serious problem only in the early 1980s. Police forces in Ghana and
Sierra Leone both allege that largely Nigerian criminals seeking new operating locations
introduced drug trafficking to their countries (United Nations, 2005). In seizure reports
gathered by the UNODC over the period 2000-2004, more than 1.4 tons of cocaine were
seized en route to West Africa or from West Africa to Europe, not including two
unusually large seizures of 2.29 and 7.5 tons (Quist, 2004). There is also an import and
re-export trade in heroin from South Asia. The key entry points for heroin are Ethiopia
and Kenya, with Egypt to a lesser extent. A courier then transports the drug cargoes
from East to West Africa, almost entirely by air courier, The Ivory Coast forming the Hub
of the trade in West Africa. However, since the outbreak of war in The Ivory Coast in
2002, there may have been a decline in heroin trafficking through the country, with a
corresponding rise in neighboring countries (Williams, 2004).
There still remains other evidence to support the view that the drug trade
remains a Nigerian specialty. According to West African statistics compiled since 2000,
92 percent of couriers intercepted with drugs transmitting through West Africa were
West Africans and no less than 56 percent were Nigerian (Quist, 2004). Law
enforcement agencies in a wide variety of countries including the Netherlands, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all report the regular interception of
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Nigerian drug couriers, and their police intelligence services believe that some Nigerian
networks have developed a very considerable share in the global narcotics market.
United States law enforcement officers have described how Nigerian networks may
collaborate with significant Columbian, Mexican, and Italian groups, in effect receiving
subcontracts from these major operators who have tended traditionally to operate in
more hierarchal structures than Nigerians (Ellis, 2004). No comprehensive figures for
drug related arrests are available, but the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
(NDLEA) reported the following numbers of arrests for the period 1994 – 2003:
cannabis, 18,775; cocaine, 559; heroin, 598; pharmaceutical psychotropic drugs, 799
(Alemika, 2004).
Several West African countries are used as a base by networks of drug
traffickers with international connections. Very large shipments via West Africa tend to
be controlled by non-Africans having one or more local accomplices. In addition, there
are significant numbers of West Africans who may attempt to smuggle narcotics from
Latin America or South Asia to Europe or North America in smaller quantities, not more
than a few kilograms, either directly or through West Africa. Typical cases would
include, for example, the 26-year-old Nigerian woman who had obtained 815 grams of
heroin in Pakistan and flew from Karachi via Dubai and Libreville before being arrested
at Cotonou airport in Benin on 30 December 2003 as she left an Air Gabon flight.
Another case was the 28 year old Nigerian man arrested on July 25 th 2003 at Addis
Ababa airport, Ethiopia, en route from Karachi to Abidijan, having swallowed no less
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than 1.266 kilograms of heroin (United Nations, 2005). The Ivory Coast has established
itself as a major transit point for heroin, although it may be in decline since the outbreak
of war in 2002. Figures compiled by the UNODC since January 2000 indicate 22 cases of
couriers bound for Abidjan, the largest city in The Ivory Coast, being intercepted in four
years. In at least 14 of these cases, one or more of those arrested was Nigerian. Most
were carrying heroin obtained in Pakistan, although one interception made at Abidjan
airport on July 9th, 2002 was of a Guinean and a Nigerian male traveling together, who
had transported 3.19 kilograms of cocaine from Curacao via Amsterdam, some of it in
their luggage, and some swallowed (United Nations, 2005).
Although the press often makes reference to “drug barons” and “drug mafias”,
there is actually no evidence for the existence of West African drug cartels in the sense
of hierarchal, rather permanent, corporation-like structures. Evidence suggests that
participants typically start out with small scale legit enterprises. For example, individuals
who try their luck as couriers or traders in legitimate goods may diversify into the illegal
sector in the attempt to make extra money. In the early 1980s, for example, it was
reported that Nigerian students in the United States often doubled as small-scale
couriers, perhaps because of the difficulties in receiving scholarship allowances at the
time (Alemika, 2004). Those that succeed may recruit couriers, usually on a one-time
basis, and join the league of larger operators through a series of networking enabling
them to expand market accessibility and profits.
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Advance – fee and Internet Fraud
Advance-fee fraud with the use of the Internet appears to be a field in which
Nigerian entrepreneurs pioneered and remain prominent. According to one of
Nigerian’s leading financial regulators, at an Interpol meeting in 2003, 122 out of 138
countries represented complained about Nigerian financial fraud in their countries
(Alemika, 2004). Although fraud can take many forms, including for example false
insurance claims, the most common type is the advance-fee fraud known as “419”,
named after the section of the Nigerian criminal code prohibiting the practice. They are
by definition attempts to obtain pre payment for goods or services that do not actually
intend to deliver. The “419” frauds in the form of paper mail are letters that contain
official looking stationary with appropriate government seals, stamps, and signatures.
The quality of the letters has evolved over the years, from poorly handwritten letters to
more professional products prepared on word processors. Advance fee fraud criminals
include sophisticated professionals who are experts in contract fraud, the conversion of
hard currency, the sale of crude oil below market prices, the purchase of real estate, the
disbursement of money from wills, threat scams, and extortion (Corsun, 1998). One
key features of typical of “419” frauds of this type is that the instigator proposes a
service that is clearly illegal, such as the laundering of illicitly acquired funds through the
target’s bank account (Williams, 2003). For this reason, Western police tended to have
little sympathy for victims of these scams and did very little, at first, to gather
information to identify the culprits. However, in recent years some police forces have
36

begun to take such crime more seriously, not only on account of their apparent size, but
also because of the realization that perpetrators of advance-fee frauds may also be
involved in other forms of crime, such as drug smuggling, which police forces do take
seriously (Ellis, 2003).
Very little startup capital is required for someone to operate a “419” scam. All
that is required are the names and addresses of prospective victims, and access to
electronic communications such as a telephone, a fax, or e-mail and internet facilities.
Today, these are easily acquired in public internet cafes or business services bureaus
One person can pose as the relative of a known figure, such as a former head of state or
minister, claiming that their late husband or parent has left behind a fabulous sum of
money that requires laundering in collaboration with a foreign partner, in return for a
percentage of the sum (Sissoko, 2004; pg. 25). Frauds of this type have increased in The
Ivory Coast since 2000 involving the Nigerians as well (Sissoko, 2004). In one such case, a
Nigerian fraud gang working in The Ivory Coast succeeded in cheating an Iranian
businessman out of $80,000 US dollars (United Nations, 2005). In the United States the
Internet Fraud Complaint Center, which receives information on Internet crime,
calculates in its 2001 Internet Fraud Report that Nigerian letter fraud cases amount to
some 15.5 percent of all complaints. The consultant who reports this statistic notes that
“while the median loss in all manner of Internet fraud was $435 US dollars, in Nigerian
scams it was significantly higher at $5, 575 US dollars (Williams, 2004). In this report for
2002, the same organization noted that of some 16,000 complaints regarding Nigerian
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fraud communications, 74 people had lost between them some $1.6 million US dollars
(United Nations, 2005).
The anonymity and impermanence of email communications makes it hard for
police forces to apprehend “419” fraudsters, but there is some information about them
that is fairly well established. Most obviously, “419” operators must be educated
enough to perform email transactions that are untraceable, and have sufficient
knowledge of international government and business practices in order to trap the
greedy and the gullible. Internet fraudsters have been known to work with lawyers,
accountants, and even members of security agencies whom they may pay for their
services. One of the most notorious cases involved several people and netted $240 –
245 million US dollars. Dr. Ukeh made initial contact with the victim, who was selected
due to his connections with others he was able to bring into the scheme. These
connections included one Emmanuel Nwude, an aspiring politician and owner of
properties in Lagos, Enugu, and London, who emerged as the main organizer of the
fraud which also included a couple, Ikechukwu and Amaka Anajemba, and a politician,
Maurice Ibekwe. Emmanuel Nwude, the suspected ring leader and ex member of the
board of Union Bank, one of the biggest financial establishments in Nigeria, remains as
one of the major shareholders in the bank today. He is also a leading shareholder in a
leading construction company G. Cappa. At the time of his arrest Nwude owned houses
in London, Lagos, and Enugu, as well as close to a dozen luxury cars. Nwude an his
accomplices are alleged to have persuaded a Brazilian banker, the head of transnational
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finance at Banco Nordeste in Sao Paolo, to send them money for what they said was the
construction of a new airport at Abujua. The Brazilian had first met the men while he
was on a visit to Nigeria in 1994. By mid-2001, he had transferred over $240 million US
dollars to fund construction of a non-existent airport. He, in fact, took the funds illegally
from his on bank, in several transfers. The Nigerian fraudsters persuaded him he was
dealing with leading officials of the Nigerian State. As various times, one of the gang
members pretended to be the governor of the Nigerian Central Bank in dealing with the
Brazilian while another posed as his deputy (Alemika, 2004). Certain fraud projects, such
as this one, may require extra personnel, especially if people are required to act the role
of a government official, a banker, an official driver, etc. All of the people involved are
typically engaged for a particular task often without being informed of the larger
scheme in which they are participating (United Nations, 2005).
Human Trafficking
Human trafficking in the region takes place in a variety of ways. One form is that
of agricultural slavery. In the Ivory Coast, it is reported that some of the immigrants
from Burkina Faso who work on cocoa plantations in the west of the country are
actually slaves (Sissoko, 2004). Cases of imported slave labor reports from Sierra Leone
describe how Lebanese or Indian businessmen traffic Indians (Lengor, 2004). The
traditional system in West Africa, whereby an adult may place a child or other young
dependent with a distant part of an extended family as an apprentice can also be
exploited for monetary gain (Williams, 2004). In Ghana, the internal trafficking of
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children is one of the biggest challenges. Many Ghanaian children are trafficked from
their home villages to work in the fishing industry. The depletion of stocks is one of the
key reasons children are needed to work in this industry. They represent cheap labor
and are often used to dive and untangle fishnets (Johansen, 2006). Again the tradition
of parents sending their children to work as apprentices is what makes this crime so
prevalent and so severely underreported.
West Africa is also a transit point for people seeking to avoid international
controls on migration. In 2003, a Nigerian citizen was arrested in Sierra Leone in the
company of six Chinese nationals whom he was helping to travel to the United Kingdom.
The organizer was working in partnership with a Chinese entrepreneur based in Nigeria
(United Nations, 2005). Both Nigerian and other international groups are said to use
Sierra Leone as a place of transit for labor migrants under the guise of refugees (Lengor,
2004).
Human trafficking is also done for the purposes of prostitution or sex slavery. In
Sierra Leone, it is reported that members of the country’s influential Lebanese
community have taken local girls to Lebanon, mostly under 18 years of age, supposedly
to work as maids. These same girls, however, are allegedly put into the prostitution
business in Lebanon. The traffickers pay money to the girls’ families to divert attention
away from their children (United Nations, 2005). There was a noticeable increase of
human trafficking of various types in Sierra Leone during the war of 1991 – 2002, as
young people went abroad to Libya, Burkina Faso, and The Ivory Coast all located in the
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region of West Africa. Men went to be trained as fighters, often lured with false
promises of education or employment. Women were forced to work for armed
movements as forced laborers or sex slaves. Throughout the armed conflict in Sierra
Leone that lasted from 1991 – 2002 thousands of women and girls were abducted by
the rebels and subjected to sexual slavery in which they were forced to become sex
slaves for their rebel “husbands”. The main perpetrators of sexual violence, including
sexual slavery were the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed
Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the
AFRC. To date there has been no accountability of the thousands of crimes of sexual
violence or other appalling human rights abuses committed during the war (Cornell,
2007).
A particularly flourishing trade in prostitutes exists in Nigeria. Many of the
women or young girls involved are from Edo state, and the main destinations are Europe
– especially Italy – and the Middle East (Alemika, 2004). Nigeria’s international trade in
prostitutes is believed by analyst to have grown in the 1990s as prospects for
employment in Nigeria deteriorated. The organizers of the trade are often women who
are former prostitutes that succeeded in making money and graduate to the status of
madams. These madams, however, still depend on men for travel documents and to
escort the girls to their destinations. A successful madam must attend to all aspects of
her business. She must organize the recruitment of prostitutes in West Africa, often on
the pretext that they will find jobs in agriculture or the hotel business in Europe, but
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must also provide false or forged travel documents for the girls. She will need to bribe
immigration officials, both in Nigeria and in transit countries; she will need to have a
network of operators in hotels or hostels; she will need to be in touch with fetish
priests, who administer an oath of secrecy on prospective prostitutes, and with lawyers
who can draft agreements binding a prostitute to a madam. Typically, a madam may
claim to have invested $40-50,000 US dollars for the costs of travel to Europe, the
prostitute is then required to repay (Williams, 2004). The large numbers of people
deported from Italy and other European Union countries in recent years suggests that
this is a flourishing field. Press reports indicate 1,116 people are deported for the
trafficking of prostitutes in 2001 alone, the majority from Italy, with others coming from
the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, and Belgium (Alemika, 2004).
Diamond Smuggling
The smuggling of diamonds has become something of a specialty in parts of
West Africa. This is due largely to the occurrence of high quality alluvial diamonds in
Sierra Leone that can be mined with no more equipment than a spade and a sieve.
Deficiencies in government permits the smuggling and other evasions of official
regulations on a massive scale. The most profitable part of the diamond trade is not the
extraction of the stones, but their export to wholesale and cutting centers overseas,
most notably in Belgium. Foreigners dominate the export business, especially Lebanese
and Syrians (many of which have been established in West Africa for generations) and to
a lesser extent, Israelis (United Nations, 2005).
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The mining and export of diamonds overlaps with crime groups in at least three
aspects. First rebel groups use diamonds to finance their war effort. While the most
notorious example is the RUF in Sierra Leone, the same has been done by the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Liberia and by groups within the
Ivory Coast. It is reported that there is a connection between Al-Qaeda and the illicit
diamond trade in West Africa. Agents of Al-Qaeda allegedly systematically bought
diamonds from Sierra Leone as a way of laundering money, and there is substantial
evidence that diamonds may be used for financing a variety of political or guerilla
movements in the Middle East (Farah, 2001& 2004). In the 1980s, the leading diamond
dealer in Sierra Leone, Jamil Said Mohammed, developed considerable influence in
Lebanon, which was at the time in the state of civil war, through his Lebanese
connections in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sierra Leone diamonds were undoubtedly a
significant source of financing the Lebanese civil war (Ellis, 1988). Secondly, diamonds
are smuggled even from areas that are not prone to conflict. Statistics covering the
diamond trade are full of discrepancies suggesting that, particularly during the war of
the 1990s, diamonds mined in Sierra Leone could be smuggled to neighboring countries
before being sent onto Belgium, so that Belgian import figures often bear little relation
to the export statistics of other countries. This illegal trade is not new, with one study
being completed in the 1950s judging the smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone to
be “the greatest smuggling operation in the world” (Fleming, 1960). In short, the
existence of a huge, barely regulated diamond sector in Sierra Leone increases the
likelihood many countries and networks in the region function illegally especially since
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the unofficial diamond trade is deeply rooted in tradition, having existed for over half a
century within this area (Williams, 2004). Third and finally, organized crime groups may
engage in the illicit diamond trade partly to cover illicit activities elsewhere, in other
words as a form of money laundering. When Sierra Leone’s economy declined in the
1980s, a shortage of foreign exchange through formal sources – banks – meant that
Lebanese diamond traders were able to provide foreign exchange which they acquired
through diamond sales. Some also obtained import businesses so to complete an
import – export cycle. Some experts in West Africa believe that some diamond
companies use diamonds to settle accounts in a form of “Hawala”, or an informal value
transfer system, so as to minimize the necessity to use banks or other conventional
financial mechanisms that would expose them to tax obligations. Some diamond
merchants who are prominent in West Africa also have diamond interests elsewhere,
notably in Central Africa, suggesting the existence of very complex movements of goods
and diamonds covering several different countries (Dietrich, 2004).
Cigarette Smuggling
The smuggling of cigarettes is recorded in several countries of the region,
including Sierra Leone, where the existence of a higher rate of excise tax on cigarettes
than in the neighboring republic of Guinea provides an incentive to smuggle cigarettes.
Although the trade is not inherently violent, it flourished in the conditions of the late
1990s civil war and has been recorded to occur between The Ivory Coast and Ghana
(Williams, 2004).
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An example of a cigarette smuggling group is the Wansa group, operating from
Sierra Leone. The head is a Fula businessman known as “Guinea Wansa”. Regarded as
the head of the syndicate, he operates from Sierra Leone but has close links with an
official trader in Guinea, who imports cigarettes from abroad. Having been brought into
Guinea by legal means, the cigarettes are exported under the cover of darkness in local
boats known as pampas, avoiding custom controls. In Sierra Leone, Wansa has a team
of four major distributors strategically located in Freetown, Bo, and Kenema. The
cigarettes are moved between these two locations by truck, generally covered by
legitimate merchandise to disguise them. Membership of the organization is secretive
and is dependent on kinship and ethnic bonds. It is notable that members of this group
in many ways do not display some of the characteristics commonly associated with
professional criminals. They are pious and other wise law abiding Muslims, who respect
the authority of Islamic religious authorities, such that any dispute between them is
generally settled by established social authorities rather than by the resort to violence
(Lengor, 2004). Those most highly specializing in cigarette smuggling are believed to
have begun as traders in legitimate goods but have branched out into cigarette business
as a means of investing capital earned elsewhere. It is most common for Fulas, who are
typically minorities in any country they live in, to smuggle small quantities at a time,
often no more than 20 cartons. One of the consequences of is, as a Sierra Leonean
police officer notes, that money gained from the illegal smuggling of cigarettes is
protected and covered by the genuine general merchandise business they operate
between Guinea and Sierra Leone (United Nations, 2005). This makes it incredibly
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difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate profits in their overall
turnover.
Money Laundering
Some of the world’s largest banks are known to have been complicit in such
schemes, including the notorious Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI),
which had more branches in Africa than in any other continent, as well as some private
banking operations (Kerry and Brown, 1992). Experienced eyewitnesses of [Nigerian
banks] consider that money laundering was greatly facilitated, at a time when the drug
trade in particular was in rapid expansion, by the growth of unlicensed financed houses,
especially in the period of 1988-1991. Other businesses regarded as particularly suitable
for money laundering include second hand car dealing and fashionable clothes
boutiques favored by female entrepreneurs (Alemika, 2004). Throughout West Africa,
almost all car purchases are of second-hand vehicles, often with few or no documents
attached. This clearly offers possibilities for money laundering through the motor trade.
The diamond trade is also widely regarded as a particularly suitable medium for money
laundering as was mentioned in the previous section. A report issued in March 2004 by
the United States State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs lists several countries as “vulnerable” to money laundering via the
diamond trade, including Liberia and Sierra Leone (Facets, 2004).
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Arms Manufacturing
Several countries in the region, but especially Ghana, have a flourishing arsenal
industry of arms manufacture. Such arsenal manufacture in Ghana is increasingly
transnational, as arms are smuggled outside Ghana for use in violent crime (United
Nations, 2005). Iron-working technology has been known in West Africa for many
centuries, but the manufacture of guns was made a criminal offence during colonial
rule. However, local smiths have not lost the skill of making guns, and recent research
indicates that local processes have become increasingly sophisticated. In one seizure of
illegal weapons in Nigeria in April 2004, the goods confiscated included not only foreign
made guns and ammunition, but also a locally assembled AK-47 assault riffle as well as
13 locally made revolvers, four double barreled shotguns, one single barreled shotgun,
and other pieces as well. The police arrested 19 illegal manufacturers (P.M. News,
Lagos, 2004). In Ghana there have also been manufacturers able to produce pistols,
shot guns, revolvers, and even in one case an AK-47 (Aning, 2004).
Ghana, in fact, appears to be the region’s most sophisticated capacity for
manufacturing firearms. According to research carried out by a leading Ghanaian
academic, all 10 regions of the country have a manufacturing capacity, concentrated in
small workshops that are able to produce 200 or more guns per year. Middlemen
export these to other parts of West Africa, including The Ivory Coast, Togo, and Nigeria
(Aning, 2004). Within Ghana, guns are sometimes used in cases of land conflicts
between leaders of the people within a tribe or for certain ethnicity disputes (Williams,
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2004). A study of 5 of Ghana’s 10 regions identified no less than 70 towns in which a
manufacturing capacity existed, with some 2,500 manufacturers in Brong-Ahafo region
alone, suggesting a total production of 40-60,000 guns annually (Aning, 2004). On April
1st 2004, Nigerian police arrested a man coming from Benin with 16 firearms purchases
in Accra, Ghana. His intention had been to sell them in the market at Onitsha, the
largest market in West Africa. The police considered they were definitely destined for
criminal use in Nigeria (Vanguard, 2004). Furthermore, similar reports of arsenal
weapons manufacturing have been received from Senegal, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Mali,
and Nigeria, although in none of these cases has the subject of arms manufacturing
been so extensively researched as it has been in Ghana (Vines, 2004).
Arms Trafficking
It is common cause that West Africa contains large quantities of illicit small arms,
although the estimates given – the figure of seven million is sometimes encountered –
appear often to be exaggerated. The Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) ordered a freeze, or a delay, on imports in October 1998, with a condition
that Member States wishing to import weapons must notify ECOWS of their intention to
secure exemption from the moratorium. However, freeze on the importation,
exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa has not
worked well. The Ivory Coast, Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Guinea have all violated it
supplying non-State actors with freshly imported weapons and ammunition while at the
same time, violating the United Nations arms embargoes, or trade restrictions, on Sierra
48

Leone and Liberia (Vines, 2004). In 2002 and 2003, for example, The Ivory Coast
allegedly received several deliveries of military equipment by air that went unreported
to the ECOWAS. For Liberia the figures for the same two years were 49 and 25
deliveries respectively (Williams, 2003). One international broker based in West Africa,
who has organized several deliveries of weapons by air and sea told a UNODC
consultant that he had never heard of the ECOWAS Moratorium (Vines, 2004).
In addition to the import and distribution of light weapons by governments,
there is also an unregulated non-State trade. Virtually every country in this region has a
problem in this regard while The Ivory Coast and Nigeria probably are the largest
importers at present. Nigeria causes particular concern because of the fierce armed
conflicts in the Niger Delta Region – which is already in the “high intensity conflict”
category with over 1,000 fatalities a year. The availability of weapons interacts with
illegal oil bunkering, widespread corruption, high youth unemployment, and social
disintegration to produce a highly dangerous mix (Vines, 2004). In Senegal too, the
existence of low level, armed conflict in the Casamance region has contributed to the
illicit circulation of light weapons. Insurgent forces in Casamance are known to have
imported weapons from Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Light weapons are traded illegally
and with only ineffective attempts at regulation by the police in the town of Touba,
regarded as the holy city by members of the Mouride Islamic brotherhood. There are
some other locations in Senegal too that are known as centers of illegal weapons trade
(United Nations, 2005).
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Oil Bunkering
“Oil bunkering” is a specialty of Nigeria, and for a long time the region’s only oil
producer (Vines, 2004). “Bunkering” is the process of filling a ship with oil, which is
increasingly done illegally. According to the Nigerian Federal government, some
300,000 barrels are illegally exported per day. Although oil bunkering on this scale
requires sophisticated organization, and the complicity of state officials up to a very high
level, it also flourishes amid the poverty and a sense of injustice in the Niger Delta area.
People in many communities feel that they derive no benefit from the oil trade, and
may therefore collaborate with criminal networks in the illegal export of oil (Williams,
2004). The Niger Delta provides illicit networks with unemployed youth and armed
ethnic militias who know the terrain well. They also face a corrupt or ineffective law
enforcement efforts and a weak judicial process. These criminal networks also enjoy
support from senior government officials and politicians, who use bunkering as a source
for political campaigning (Vines, 2004).
The oil bunkering syndicates are highly international, including not only other
West Africans, but also Moroccans, Venezuelans, Lebanese, French, and Russians. By
these means, oil-bunkering links to wider patterns of organized crime, with cash, drugs,
and weapons, all being traded in exchange for illegal oil. A typical oil bunkering case
was reported in a Nigerian newspaper on April 22nd 2004, reporting the arrest by the
Nigerian navy of a ship loaded with 8,000 metric tons of crude oil without valid papers.
Its crew of eight foreigners where also arrested (United Nations, 2005). Such cases
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reveal the possible extent of the problem. However, relatively little is known as to the
nature and over all extent of the problem.
Armed Robbery
In The Ivory Coast a serious problem of armed robbery grew in the 1980s in
which armed robbers would identify business offices harboring cash and hold
employees hostage. The war since 2002 has favored armed robbery of various types.
Some criminal gangs in Northern Nigeria have included demobilized ex combatants from
neighboring countries (United Nations, 2005). In Sierra Leone too, demobilized fighters
are recorded as forming armed gangs such as the West Side Boys. Some such groups
may receive arms from the regular armed forces. They may sell stolen goods in
neighboring countries, and are also reported to have developed connections as far away
as Gambia, Mali, and The Ivory Coast (Lengor, 2004). Senegal’s crime shows an
extraordinary emphasis on all types of theft. Senegalese police report groups of up to
15, armed with automatic weapons, including Guinea-Biassauans, Liberians, and Sierra
Leoneans, involved in transnational crime. This is also the case in Casamance and close
to the northern borders of Senegal with Mali and Mauritania as well. Individuals are
believed to be involved in cattle-rustling, smuggling, and armed robbery. In 2000-2003
the Senegalese authorities prosecuted 2,400 members of crime groups, 1,500 of those
were charged with armed robbery. Armed robbers do, in fact, use violence; hence, a
large amount of attention from police is focused on such groups resulting in higher
arrest rates (Niang, 2004).
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In Benin, one Harmani Tidjani led a multinational-armed gang that specialized in
car jacking and car theft through several West African countries and even in France. The
gang’s activities were so notorious that the Nigerian government closed its border with
Benin to accentuate its demands for action by the Beninese authorities. Tidjani,
however, escaped to Mali, using bribery to facilitate his escape. He was, however,
subsequently arrested, extradited to Benin and finally Nigeria. As a result, the President
of Benin fired 13 senior security officials, including from the Presidency, the Defence
Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior (Williams, 2004).
Use of Corruption
Analyzing crime in West Africa also requires one to consider the controversial
topic of corruption. While there is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted
definition of corruption, it is generally considered to be the illegitimate use of public
resources for private gain and with no doubt it exists in all countries world wide in some
shape or form. Corrupt conduct typically includes bribery, embezzlement, theft, and
fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, favoritism, and discrimination, the exploitation of
conflicting interests, and improper political donations. These conducts all pertain to
crime committed in the context of a public-service occupation or responsibility (Shehu,
2004). As researcher Abdullahi Y. Shehu concluded, corruption in Nigeria has become a
way of life under socioeconomic conditions that not only facilitate corruption but make
it necessary for economic survival for even the most conscientious citizen. Military rule
has been blamed for allowing corruption to grow unchecked. When President Olusegun
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Obasanjo was inaugurated as a civilian president of Nigeria on May 29th, 1999 he
identified corruption as Nigeria’s most pressing problem vowing to fight it at every level.
Despite these reform efforts, corruption in Nigeria has not declined, and there is some
evidence that it is occurring at high government levels (Shehu, 2004).
Widespread corruption has many horrendous consequences, including
inefficiency, mistrust of the government by citizens, discouragement of enterprise, and
political instability. A high level of corruption stems from a wide discrepancy between
the attitudes and objectives of a government and those of the society in which it
operates. Pre-colonial West African society had a primitive bureaucracy and money
played a minor role. According to an article released by the University of Keele of the
United Kingdom, traditional customs such as exchange gifts and extended families,
contributed to corruption only when they came into contact with colonial society. The
most important areas of divergence between the colonial government and the West
Africans were the operations of a literature government in an illiterate society and
conflicts between laws and popular attitudes. When only those who can read and write
are admitted into public service, the illiterate majority often resorts to bribing the
lowest public functionaries in order to cope with regulations that they do not
understand. In turn, minor public servants can use power over illiterates to increase
their pay. Laws made in attempt to prohibit activities favored by the public are
vulnerable to corruption. The colonial government imposed many regulations, which
conflict with traditional attitudes and these conflicts have not disappeared with the
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coming of independence. According to this particular piece of research, West Africans
show no resentment toward proven corruption among high level officials as corruption
works to soften conflict, reduce friction, and cements relationships between power
holders and those who control the wealth during the initial stages of national
development (Fleming, 1957).
While this argument may very well explain some of the root causes of
corruption occurring in this sector of the world it does not emphasize the role that
Africans themselves played in solidifying the problem. While European ideas of proper
governance and public administration heavily influenced the formation of newly
independent African states, the new governments were also formed to a considerable
extent by the actions and ideas of Africans that fulfilled the hierarchy, most particularly
in the systems of indirect rule (Bayart, 1993). Hence, if the historical roots of modern
systems of political corruption and of political violence can be traced back to colonial
times, this has to be studied not only in terms of the formal arrangements made by
European colonial officials, which generally entailed unjustly harsh powers of taxation
and coercion, but also the formal and informal practices of African agents who
participated in the colonial system (Williams, 2003). It has become commonplace for
African authors to attribute a high degree of responsibility for modern day corruption to
the African elites that have governed their countries since independence (Ayittey,
1996). The suggestion; however, that corruption in modern West Africa is a result of
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ruling elites who inherited authoritarian colonial systems of governance fails to consider
the degree to which corruption may be a product of patron-client systems of politics.
The Patron-Client system is the name given to a particular way of structuring a
society such that it is organized in a roughly hierarchical structure. Each person in the
hierarchy has a "patron" above them (perhaps more than one) and a number of clients
below them. Basically in the patron-client system, people seek to make mutually
beneficial alliances, with the less powerful people seeking out the more powerful people
and offering allegiance in exchange for protection and benefits. So if an individual found
a person he or she wanted as a patron, that individual would offer his or her allegiance
to them as a client, promising to do what he or she can to enhance their patron’s honor.
In return for service their patron might grant his/her client or a friend of the client’s to a
position in government or some other favor the client wants. Hence society is made up
of this huge web of tree-like structures of Patron-Client relationships. The clients offer
their faithfulness and the patron responds by granting favors. Clients could ask
particular favors of their patrons, or alternatively a patron could shower their clients
with gifts, and the client was then expected to praise in extravagant terms their patron's
generosity to others thus increasing the patron's honor. Of course if one client has a
reputation for extravagantly praising his or her patron for their gifts, other patrons
would seek that particular client out, wanting to effectively invest in that client, giving
him or her gifts in exchange for being publicly praised. Thus corruption was used by
individuals at all levels of society having roots deep in the history of Africa, and not only
55

in the apparatus of colonial control (Williams, 2003). At what point then does this type
of activity no longer classify as corruption, which suggest certain behavior is out of the
ordinary and instead qualify as a description of business as usual?
The work of crime groups is facilitated if they are able to enlist the complicity,
active or passive, of state officials and without a doubt this occurs in West Africa (United
Nations, 2005). For example, the January 2004 arrest of an international smuggling
gang in Ghana that had imported no less than 675 kilograms of cocaine, with a street
value estimated at $140 million US dollars, led to the suspects being released on bail of
just $200,000 US dollars, causing a great outcry in the press. Both the Minister of the
Interior, Hackman Owusu Agyeman, and the Attorney-General, Paapa Owusu Ankomah,
objected, demanding the incarceration of the suspects. A leading Ghanaian researcher
reports that even those who work for the narcotics Control Boar are scared to confront
the levels of corruption in the criminal justice system (Aning, 2004). There are other
examples from Ghana suggesting that criminals are able to bribe judges. The Ivory Coast
minister of justice has hinted at a very similar state of affairs, referring to the country’s
justice system as “wrecked” (Sissoko, 2004). The anti-corruption organization
Transparency International publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index. In its
2003 index, Ghana ranks at number 50, Senegal 66, The Ivory Coast 71 (the same as the
Russian Federation and India), while Nigeria was ranked at 101, deemed the second
most corrupt country in the world (Williams, 2004).
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The interface between crime and politics, or crime and legitimate business,
straddles the grey area of corruption. Although there is a considerable amount of
literature on corruption, only a small part of the research that has been done seems
useful for addressing this issue as it actually occurs in West Africa (Williams, 2004).
Corruption is often hidden, or at least is not openly admitted by its perpetrators and is
rarely proven to a legal standard in a court of law making very little information
available to assess the extent of to which criminal groups make use of it.
Political Influence
In Ghana, a former head of the Narcotics Control Board has indicated drug
dealers are able to influence certain politicians (Aning, 2004). But perhaps the most
blatant case of political involvement with criminal networks in the region of West Africa
concerns the late Maurice Ibekwe, a member of Nigeria’s Federal House of
Representatives arrested for financial fraud, forgery, and conspiracy. He had served as
Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Police Affairs (Alemika, 2004). Most security
officials in Ghana, however, reject any suggestion that drug dealers may influence
certain politicians, although some do make such allegations. There are cases, however,
where people in authority try to stop the trial of people accused of selling drugs. K.B.
Quantson, former National Security Coordinator and former head of the Narcotics
Control Board, recounts that in one case, in between the arrest and trial of one
particular suspect “tremendous pressure was exerted on me from all over to drop the
case”. He also accused the Attorney General’s Office of dragging its feet in confiscating
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the property of the same drug dealer, as stipulated by the law at the time, after they
had been found guilty and imprisoned. Some members of the law enforcement
agencies in Ghana indicate their frustration at the failure to prosecute drug traffickers
when it is revealed that one particular judge keeps releasing suspects under very
strange conditions (Aning, 2003).
In Nigeria, politics are considered highly corrupt by financial enticement. Many
wealthy patrons in politics exhibit enormous wealth that has no obvious origin (Alemika,
2004). However, only in small number of cases has it be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that senior political figures like Maurice Ibekwe have been directly implicated in
the activities of criminal networks. More common is the ambivalence attributed to
some politicians in Ghana by an investigator, who noted that many of them are tempted
to turn a blind eye to crime, believing that it is preferable to the type of war that has
disfigured some other countries of the region. This could be taken to suggest that
criminal interests have become so powerful in some countries that they pose a potential
political threat. More realistically, it indicates that some powerful people consider
crime less as a menace to combat than as a form of activity that at least generates
income, and therefore may help to alleviate the misery that helps stoke the fires of civil
war (United Nations, 2005). Similar attitudes may very well prevail throughout the
region.
In regards of political involvement in advance fee fraud, the advance fee fraud
involving Emmanuel Nwude can again be used to illustrate political involvement as this
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case suggests a strong connection to Nigerian politics. Several of those involved were
connected with the country’s ruling Popular Democratic Party (PDP). Emmanuel Nwede
was a prominent supporter, and one of his key accomplices, Dr. Ukeh, was a PDP
candidate for the position of governor of one of the Nigeria’s states. It was Dr. Ukeh
who had first made contact with the Brazilian bank manager who was to be their victim.
Also involved in the scheme was Maurice Ibekwe, a member of the Federal House of
Representatives – Nigeria’s lower house of parliament – from 1999 until his arrest.
Ibekwe even served as chairman of the House’s Subcommittee on Police Affairs, and has
been reelected in the 2003 parliamentary elections as a candidate of the PDP, the ruling
party (Alemika 2004, Eriye 2004).
Overall, then there is little evidence – with some alarming exceptions – to
suggest that politicians may be directly involved with criminal networks, but much of
the evidence suggests they may be complicit in various ways ranging from an
unwillingness to contemplate the issue of transnational crime and criminal groups
involved, to a complicity that is hard to distinguish from corruption. There may be,
however, some major cases of direct political involvement in crime that are covered up
due to their political sensitivity. For example, in Nigeria the illegal export of oil, or oil
bunkering, is said by observers to be facilitated by political authorities at very high levels
(Ebbe, 1999). It has become common practice for politicians to benefit from the profits
of oil bunkering by using money to help fund political campaigns (Vines, 2004).
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In countries where full-scale war develops, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, it
becomes difficult to distinguish between the activities of criminal networks and political
violence. There are now disturbing signs that a similar evolution may take place in The
Ivory Coast. The robbery of a bank in Bouake, the second largest city in The Ivory Coast,
under control of the rebel Forces Nouvelles movement, was reportedly organized by
one of the leaders of the rebellion, and a major bank hold up in Abidjan in 2002 is also
believed to have been organized by a future leader of the insurrection, make clear the
close connection between political violence and crime (United Nations, 2005). This also
suggest the formation of a nexus of political disorder that provides a suitable
environment for crime, creating a triangular logic of disorder, violence, and crime in
which each become a consequence of the other.
A similar phenomenon has been noted in Senegal where reports the export of
marijuana from the Casamance region towards other parts of Senegal is favored by
conditions of low intensity conflict (Niang, 2004). Not only does the organization of
armed struggle require financing, which increasingly may come from criminal activity,
but in extreme cases the state itself may become under the control of professional
criminals (Napoleoni, 2003). Some observers would have considered this to be the case
of Liberia under the presidency of Charles Taylor, from 1997-2003. The rebellion of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone has often been presented in such a
manner. A Sierra Leonean police officer notes the significance in this regard of the
RUF’s having obliged the legitimate government of the country to share power, allowing
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the RUF’s leader, Foday Sankoh, to occupy a position equivalent to that of a vice
president and gaining control of the precious minerals department of the government
(Lengor, 2004). The Sierra Leonean president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, has represented
the war in his country as a criminal enterprise on a national scale (Lengor, 2004).
Indeed, the Sierra Leone police report that members of the Armed Forces Ruling
Council, the group of military officers that had power 1997-1998, themselves pioneered
the use of Sierra Leone as a transit point in the transnational drug trade (Lengor, 2004).
In such cases distinctions between crime and political activity become difficult, since the
authorities responsible for enforcing the law of the land may themselves be organizers
of criminal activity (Williams, 2004).
Connection to Legitimate Entrepreneurs & Investors
Different groups of individuals tend to cooperate instead of compete in order to
more successfully complete business transactions. It appears that, whereas the old
established “mafias” where thought to have the ability to transport very large quantities
of narcotics to the United States, the most successful West African syndicates import
smaller quantities but enjoy an exceptional range of contacts and an impressive
flexibility of organization that enables them to exploit market niches that the major
mafias cannot always reach. It is by these means that West African drug traders have
managed to gain a major stake in what is, literally, the world’s most cut throat market,
without the need to use violence (Williams, 2004). Ad hoc relationships created within
the criminal networks of West Africa allow groups to collaborate sporadically and
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sometimes anonymously to avoid detection from law enforcement and to refrain from
infringing on market territories of larger more powerful groups. In a way, West African
crime groups have found a way to penetrate market opportunity by offering larger
groups with a means to an end in manufacturing, transporting, and providing goods and
services illicitly.
Specialists in different aspects of crime in West Africa claim long-term
specialization in a particular field or commodity is rather rare. An entrepreneur who has
been successful in one field of operation may move into another field if the opportunity
presents itself, including that of legitimate commerce. For example, an entrepreneur
who has been successful in the drug trade may invest his or her profits in a legitimate
business, not purely as a form of camouflage, but simply in pursuit of a commercial
logic. By the same token, an entrepreneur who has become established in a field such
as the import of cars or spare parts may use the capital, the infrastructure and the
commercial contacts thus acquired to move into some branch of illicit commerce. In
The Ivory Coast too, the police find that individuals of legit business enterprises may be
members of one or several crime groups simultaneously. In the 1980s and 1990s, such
groups were involved in armed robbery and drug trafficking, according to Ivorian
sources (Sissoko, 2004).
Massive illegal transactions take place in the field of foreign exchange fraud,
often involving international companies that may conspire in false accounting, thus
allowing well connected Nigerians to move large amounts of money to bank accounts
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abroad. This became a major activity during the 1970s, when practiced by Lebanese,
Asian, and European companies such as Johnson Mathew bank (Alemika, 2004). The
scale of this activity may be appreciated by reference to the billions of dollars stolen by
senior officials, including a former head of state, General Sani Abacha, much of which
ended up in western banks (Nwankwo, 1999).
Transnational Operations
Overall, transnational crime in West Africa may involve persons of West African
origin collaborating with others from outside the region – for example, Russian and
other foreign nationals have been arrested in Nigeria in connection with oil bunkering –
or it may involve West Africans based in their home region maintaining relations with
refugees who have since become scattered. In general, it is difficult to separate the
regional dimension of transnational crime from its global dimension. For example, a
Nigerian-dominated internet fraud group such a the Kakudu group works out of Sierra
Leone, and has links to Guinea, Gambia, and the Ivory Coast as well as Nigeria, but
identifies many of its potential victims outside of Africa. Heroin imported from Asia and
cocaine from South America maybe moved from one country to another within the
West African region to evade law enforcement detection, but the ultimate destination is
almost invariably in a country outside of Africa (Williams, 2004).
It is not possible to capture accurately all the cross border movements of goods
within the region, but a number of points may tentatively be made. First, the classic
smuggling trades are in goods that have a high international value relative to their bulk,
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with drugs and diamonds being obvious examples. They are rather easy to transport in
quantities that can be carried by a single person and even hidden on the body, and yet
can be exchanged for very large sums of money upon delivery to a trader based in
Europe, North America, or elsewhere. Second, in order to facilitate the transport of
goods, smugglers may well move them within the West African region. Nigeria is so well
established as a source of drugs that Nigerian smugglers clearly prefer to use other
countries as staging posts. This may also apply to diamonds, illegal immigrants, or other
cargoes. Although such trade can be considered as internal to the West African region,
it is also linked to other parts of the globe. The main exception of this concerns goods
that have low international value relative to their bulk, and therefore are not traded
outside the West African region. Examples of these types of goods would include cattle,
which are smuggled across Senegal’s borders into Guinea- Bissau, but no further, and
locally manufactured firearms, which are made in Ghana and smuggled into neighboring
countries, but rarely further than Nigeria (Ebbe, 1999).
Combating Transnational Crime
To alleviate the problems facilitated by transnational crime and the actors
involved previous research calls for a higher level of international law enforcement
cooperation and communication. Transnational criminal operations – such as drug
smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism, and internet-related crimes – have increased
the need for criminal justice personnel and institutions to establish structures, policies,
and procedures of cooperation (Lewis, 2007). This is necessary in order for jurisdictions
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in which crimes occur to pursue and interview suspects and witnesses in other
jurisdictions, as well as to have access to documentary evidence that exists in
jurisdictions other than where victimization occurs. Currently some of existing
institutions and structures of international cooperation in addressing transnational
crime are the United Nations, Interpol, Europol, and the European Union (Aroma, 2006).
All international bodies have fallen short of the challenges posed by transnational crime.
This has set the stage for the possibility of the creation of an international coordinating
body composed of countries whose citizens are most at risk for victimization by
transnational criminals and terrorists.
Other strategies for combating transnational crime include the provision of more
effective protection for witnesses who have inside knowledge of those engaged in
transnational crime. Reversing the burden of proof so that the offender must prove
assets of high consumer value were not acquired through criminal proceeds is another
tactic used to crack down on illegal markets. The interception of communications along
with intrusive surveillance is also argued necessary to identify and develop profiles of
key members of criminal organizations (Aroma, 2006). While this has raised some
concern in regard to privacy rights, there is a need for legal administrative measures
designed to prevent criminal groups from infiltrating and developing legitimate
businesses by using capital from criminal enterprises. Some researchers suggest hostnation governments, with the support of the United States Government Special Forces,
are an even match for criminal/terrorist organizations.
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“Through a deliberate process of detection utilizing United States and host
nation assets, network structure and ties can be assessed accordingly. A process
of dynamic attenuation, where network ties, and not the actors in the network,
are targeted should replace the current United States strategy of killing or
capturing individual criminal agents. By dynamically attenuating instead of
destroying the ties between and among criminal actors and criminal
organizations, the United States can effectively reduce the capability of criminal
and terrorist organizations from operating and achieving their missions” (Serena,
2007; 87).

The process by dynamic attenuation actually means to resolve the problem of
transnational crime through the “energetic shrinking” of the groups involved. This
shrinking is brought about by more or less the same tactics, which include arresting
individuals believed to be associated with organized crime. Resolutions such as this one
seem to fall short of the big picture. To focus mainly on how crime groups function in
order to weaken network ties to, in effect, shrink them, distracts one from addressing
the reasons for which transnational crime is able to thrive and why it thrives in the first
place. Regardless of the wars waged against crime, drugs, terrorism, etc., all attempts to
disrupt criminal networks have failed in the overall grand scheme of what has yet to
come as transnational crime continues to thrive and remains a seemingly permanent
component of the capitalist lifestyle.
Most of the causes of transnational crime are similar to the factors that drive
crime in general. The globalization of the economy, increased numbers and diverse
nature of immigrants, and improved communications facilitate crime or provide criminal
opportunities, but they do not cause transnational crime. There have been eight
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different issues identified all relating to the structures, strategies, and tactics of
transnational crime and to the law enforcement efforts to address this form of
criminality:










The interaction among politics, the media, and resource sharing and the
resulting tendency to characterize the problem inaccurately while
making policy and resource allocation decisions that have little to do
with the control of smuggling of crime of any sort.
The need for less rhetoric and more empirical research as a basis for
policymaking. Additional issues include
The need to focus on criminal markets and conduct a market analysis,
The sparse and often unreliable information evaluating the impact of
transnational crime and the impact of law enforcement efforts to
address it.
Lack of clarity about the concepts of organized crime and organized
transnational crime.
The need to focus on the local bases of transnational crimes
The organization of policing for enforcement related to criminal groups
Consideration of alternative policing options for law enforcement
related to transnational crime (Beare & Naylor, 1999; 11).

The challenges involved in the prevention and control of transnational crime can
stem from varied cultural and societal conditions and from the various national
orientations for laws and law enforcement (Finckenauer, 2000). The laws enacted can
actually do more to facilitate and benefit transnational crime markets rather than
hinder them, even if the networks involved are countered by “dynamic attenuation”.
This is why policy made to counter transnational crime is extremely critical. The final
section addresses the economic and political climate of West Africa and how the current
circumstances of this world region do not allow for reactionary individual arrests or
“dynamic attenuation” to hinder the global problem of transnational crime.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
The Structural Adjustment of Africa
In the first chapter the concepts neo-liberal and neo-conservative politics were
mentioned as the driving force behind the process of globalization. Neo-conservative
politics share in the ideals of neo-liberalism by advocating a free market model economy
and a disdain for social welfare (Kraska 2004). In regards to the present day reality of
transnational crime in West Africa, Structural Adjustment Programs enacted in West
Africa by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were founded upon neo
liberal principles. The structural adjustment programs most certainly contribute to social
and economic problems faced by countries becoming involved in transnational crime.
Many African states trying to establish a capitalist economy with the help of loans issued
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been struggling to
pay back debt due to strangling economic effects of the Structural Adjustment
Programs. These loans were only issued if borrowing states would abide by certain
guidelines entailed by The World Bank and the contract of the loan issued by the
International Monetary Fund. Under a plan devised by President Reagan’s Secretary to
the Treasury, James Baker, indebted developing countries were offered World Bank and
IMF “servicing” loans in return for the “structural adjustment” of their economies. This
meant that the economic direction of each country would be planned, monitored and
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controlled in Washington. “Liberal containment” was replaced by laissez-faire capitalism
known as the “free market” (Pilger, 1998).
The IMF has prescribed the same medicine for vulnerable state economies for over
two decades which includes:


Monetary austerity. Tightening up the money supply to increase internal interest
rates to whatever heights needed to stabilize the value of the local currency.



Fiscal austerity. Increase tax collections and reduce government spending
dramatically.



Privatization. Sell off public enterprises to the private sector.



Financial Liberalization. Remove restrictions on the inflow and outflow of
international capital as well as restrictions on what foreign businesses and banks
are allowed to buy, own, and operate (Hanhel, 1999).

President George Bush Jr., will claim that rules based global mechanisms are needed,
the mainstream media, however, often does not ask what the rules themselves are, and
whether they are most appropriate. The IMF/World Bank plans are actually devised in
secret and are not open for discussion or dissent (Stiglitz, 1999). Since the introduction
of the IMF structural “assistance” Africa's income has dropped by 23 percent (Colgan,
2002). The basic assumption behind structural adjustment was that a free unregulated
market would bring benefits to both the poor and the rich. In the Darwinian world of
international markets, the strongest would win out. This would encourage others to
follow their example. The development of a capitalist economy with an increase in the
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role of the private sector was thought to be the ideal way to stimulate economic growth
(Hahnel, 1999). African countries do, in fact, require essential investments in health,
education and infrastructure. The World Bank and IMF instead require countries to
reduce state support and protection for social and economic sectors. They insisted on
pushing weak African economies into markets where they were unable to compete with
the might of the transnational private sector. These policies further undermined the
economic development of African countries (Colgan, 2002). The key issue with
structural adjustments of this kind, however, is whether they build the capacity to
recover and whether they promote long term development. The adjustments dictated
by the World Bank and IMF did neither (Stiglitz, 1999). In these ways then, the IMF and
World Bank encouraging new states to open up for foreign trade and investment is too
aggressive. While this is often described as putting new states on a level playing field
with wealthier countries, wealthy countries are usually far more powerful and with
more resources at hand, create anything but an even playing field. Most new states
transitioning into a capitalist market system rule will lose. Because some of the poor
nations are not as aggressive in privatization and other conditionality’s, as the IMF or
World Bank would like, they face continual delays of debt relief fueling the spread and
profitability of markets conducted illegally at the transnational level.
The epidemic of transnational crime in the region of West Africa could perhaps be a
consequence of the economic hardships endeavored by countries finding themselves
locked economically and politically by the confines of Structural Adjustment Programs.
The economic policies encouraged by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
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do much to foster a hospitable environment for transnational crime by deregulating the
market and encouraging free trade across the globe. The economic desperation that
occurs when profits from exports are unable to keep up with the price of imports
needed for basic necessities of human survival fosters not only a hostile environment,
but also a criminal environment, by making the fast hard cash of illicit markets even
more appealing.
Most importantly transnational crime, as it exist in West Africa, and in comparison
with other regions around the world, is prevalent not as a result of evil, conspiring, large
corporate entities looking to monopolize illicit markets, but as an ending result of poor
economic planning and the implication of condemning foreign economic policy. The
actors involved have structured themselves to function just as any other capitalist
business enterprise would, through a series of networks involving as little or as many
individuals necessary to finish a job. The use of the term “group” when describing the
collaboration of individuals should be done with extreme caution due to the fact
individuals often conspire together on a one time basis only to involve other partners
when another business opportunity arises or specialization in a specific area is needed.
Structural Adjustment Programs encourage corruption and undermine democracy
by making elected governments accountable to Washington-based institutions instead
of their own people. In some cases, corrupt governments have borrowed money from
these institutions and/or directly from various donor nations and ended up using that
money to pursue conflicts, for arms deals, or to divert resources away from their
people. However, in most cases that has been done knowingly, with the support of
71

various rich nations due to their own “national interests” (Colgan, 2002). While the
conditional terms of loans issued by The World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund may be described as “reforms”, “adjustments”, “restructuring” or some other
benign-sounding term, the effects on the poor are the same if not worse than those
inflicted by transnational crime. While the illicit enterprises and criminal activity
associated with transnational crime may have devastating effects on the stability of
governments and their ability to effectively meet the basic necessities of their people,
the infractions do not compare to the devastation inflicted by the Structural Adjustment
Programs based on neo-liberal politics. A critical interpretation of structural
adjustments and other trade related policies could see them as forms of transnational
crime or terrorism in and of itself. Transnational crime helps to illustrate how the
injustices occurring at the macro level trickle down to effect society at the micro level in
which a rise in crime, corruption, and armed conflict will inherently occur. It is such
trade policy implemented by the World Bank that inadvertently has given rise to illicit
international markets, armed conflict, and high levels of international fraud that have
become not only necessary and vital components for economic survival, but favorable in
markets that thrive on unrestricted, unregulated expansion and profit potential.
Conclusion
Transnational crime, according to the information gathered for the purpose of
this project, appears to be an unintended consequence of the process of globalization,
the creation of not only one world capitalist economy but of one uniform culture.
Transnational crime, then, cannot be hindered by individual interceptions of smugglers
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caught at the border or by the arrest of alleged crime group members. Instead of asking
whom to arrest in order to hinder illicit transnational markets, it may be more beneficial
to examine how capitalism, criminal policy, prohibition, war, and politicking all
collaborate to create the environment in which it is extremely profitable and worth the
risk to engage in transnational crime. If the focus of transnational crime research
continues to only consider the individuals involved in order to better intercept and
arrest them, the problems associated with transnational crime will never be eliminated.
This practice only serves to legitimate institutions whose mandate is set on criminal
interception. Transnational crime does not appear to exist due to the isolated activity of
various transnational criminal groups. Instead, it seems to be a consequence of
capitalism which promotes a free unrestricted market, the consumption of goods, and a
profit driven enterprise. The capitalist notion of the accumulation of large sums of
money drives entrepreneurs to seek out profit potential in alternative ways. A sovereign
state carries with it the burden of enacting law through the interpretation of the few
who wish to maintain the legitimacy of their rule and will set up institutions in order to
reinforce those rules and standards of conformity. A class struggle occurs in the
continuation of the process of globalization and its inflictions on the division of labor
and the material conditions for which those members of the state have available to
them. When the material conditions to not meet the vital necessities for life and the
governments are unable to guarantee vital necessities to ensure the liberty of life,
alternative means will be made to see such needs are met.
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Conflictions with market demands and the material conditions within a sovereign
state prevent a free market from flourishing legitimately, especially when involvement
in legitimate commerce does not make the basic necessities one needs to survive
accessible. Young entrepreneurs eagerly look for new opportunities to invest in markets
outside of the law to make up for a decline in stock. To encourage new states whose
borders are not yet stable to engage in free trade inadvertently promotes alternative
markets, especially when there is the potential to make large amounts of money fast
and laws enacted against such markets only maximize profit potential (Williams, 2004).
When such large amounts of money are at stake capitalist culture and ideology help
perpetuate markets that generate a substantial profit, whether they are licit or illicit,
national or transnational.
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